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In January 1998, the Archusa Creek Dam in southeast Mississippi failed by breaching through its emergency spillway. At the time of 
its failure, the dam had a concrete ogee weir for a principal spillway and a vegetated earth emergency spillway. Fortunately, the dam is 
a low hazard structure, as there is little development downstream, and consequences of failure were mostly limited to the loss of a 
state-owned, recreational water park. The dam failed as a result of a 5-year storm event, triggered by intense rainfall of nearly 4.25 in. 
in just a few hours. Runoff generated by the storm caused a rapid rise in lake level to elevation above the flood pool, resulting in flow 
over the emergency spillway. A breach then formed through the emergency spillway due to progressive erosion and head-cutting 
caused by excessive water flow velocity, a well-known failure mechanism. This paper examines how the failure happened, including 
the aspects leading up to the breach. Hydrologic, hydraulic, and geotechnical aspects of the failure are discussed, including the dam’s 
design and subsequent modifications, its problems leading to failure, the engineering solution used to repair the dam, and how this 
solution solves the problems that led to failure in the first place. 
INTRODUCTION 
Archusa Creek Dam was built in 1971. Figure 1 illustrates the 
location of the dam near Quitman, Mississippi. A state agency 
owns the lake and dam; it is used exclusively for recreation 
(operation of a water park). The lake is shallow, with typical 
depth of about 1.2 m (4 ft), and generally ranging from 1.2 to 
2.4 m (4 to 8 ft).  
The lake is about 172 ha (425 ac). The size of the lake’s 
watershed is about 15,800 ha (39,000 ac), resulting in 
significant in-flow to the lake during storm events. There is 
little storage volume available in the lake compared to in-flow; 
consequently, the dam must pass nearly all in-flow. 
The lake is in the flood-plain of the Chickasawhay River. A 
high river stage produces tail-water below the dam that often 
exceeds the lake elevation.  
Dam Details 
The dam is built of compacted earth fill with a maximum 
height of 7.6 m (25 ft) and a length of about 1370 m (4,500 ft). 
The dam is homogenous, with no internal seepage control and 
no foundation cut-off. Fill material for the dam is generally 
fine silty sand as this soil was locally available for 
construction. 
In the 1980s, the principal spillway was fitted with an 
inflatable gate; this configuration was modified in 1994 due to 
ongoing problems with maintenance and vandalism. In 1994, 
the spillway was modified with an ogee crest and series of 
sluice gates through the ogee. The crest and the gate inlets 
were all fitted with fish-retaining screens. Figure 2 illustrates 
these spillway modifications. Notably, the fish-retaining 
screens clogged with debris during the failure storm and 
contributed to breaching by restricting spillway capacity. 






Fig. 1. Location map (source map USGS Quitman, Miss. Quadrangle, 1983). 
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Grates placed on spillway crest 
and over sluice gate openings
Flood debris left 
in spillway
 Fig. 2.  Photo showing spillway modifications. 
For passing in-flow exceeding the principal spillway capacity, 
the dam was designed with an uncontrolled emergency 
spillway, with a vegetated earth surface/lining. During the 
1994 modification, the emergency spillway was widened from 
120 m (400 ft) to 300 m (1,000 ft). This modification was 
effected by excavating the embankment down to spillway 
elevation over this portion of the dam. It was again modified 
shortly before the 1998 failure with the excavation of a 
drainage ditch within the spillway to facilitate rapid drainage 
of flood water from lake-side residential yards. Residents of 
several lake-side houses built within the flood pool had 
complained of water in their yards after storms that raised the 
lake to or near its flood-pool. The ditch excavation in the 
emergency spillway was undertaken to appease these 
complaints. This later modification contributed to the dam 
breach by initiating erosion in the emergency spillway. 
Figures 1 and 3 illustrate the position of the emergency 
spillway on the dam. It is located near the middle of the dam 
at the maximum section as opposed to one of the abutments. 
Consequently, the soils below the emergency spillway were 
primarily fill, not native in-situ soil. The soil forming the 
emergency spillway was fine silty sand placed as fill. When 
the emergency spillway was widened, the excavation was 
extended into the sand fill placed to build the dam. 
DETAILS OF DAM BREACH FAILURE 
The breach was formed by the erosion of soil within the 
vegetated earth emergency spillway due to the high discharge 
velocity, which the spillway surface could not sustain. Figures 
3 and 4 illustrate the position of the breach within the dam. 
The storm causing the failure was an event corresponding to a 
5-year return period. Rainfall from this storm was nearly 16.5 
cm (6.5 in.) in a 3-day period. However, the dam’s failure was 
preceded by intense rainfall of 10.8 cm (4.25 in.) over a period 
of only a few hours. Figure 5 illustrates the grass lining on the 
emergency spillway, and shows the fine sand soil within the 
spillway.  Figure 6 illustrates the lake’s shallow depth (note 







Fig. 3. Breach through emergency spillway. 
Archusa Creek Dam,
Clark County, Mississippi
Fig. 4. Close-up view of breach. 
Fig. 5. Photo showing grass surface on spillway. 
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Fig. 6. Photo illustrating principal spillway and typical depth 
of lake. 
Emergency Spillway Operation 
Analysis shows that the emergency spillway would activate 
with a storm corresponding to a 2-year return period. 
Consequently, the emergency spillway was subjected to 
frequent flow. Hydraulic analysis indicates that flow in the 
emergency spillway in the 1998 failure storm was 200 m3/s 
(7,000 cu ft/s), with a velocity exceeding 1.5 m/s (5 ft/s).  
Erosion Mechanism   
NRCS and USACE design references establish a range of 
velocity that a vegetated earth spillway can sustain. The 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) (2003) 
tabulates sustainable velocity listed in applicable NRCS and 
USACE design guide documents, as excerpted below, in Fig. 
7. The NRCS document establishes a typical sustainable 
velocity in the range of 0.6 to 1.5 m/s (2 to 5 ft/s), depending 
on the base soil and the grass type. Maximum sustainable 
velocity (atypical) is about 2.4 m/s (8 ft/s) for a non-erodible 
soil and specific Bermuda species of grass. 
The type of fine silty sand soil used as fill in the emergency 
spillway has a low resistance to erosion. According to the 
criteria in Fig. 7, maximum sustainable velocity on the 
Archusa Creek Dam’s emergency spillway is 0.8 m/s (2.5 
ft/s). Based on the calculated velocity during the 1998 failure 
storm near 1.5 m/s (5 ft/s), erosion through the spillway 
material would have been expected. The calculated velocity is 
based on the broad, flat spillway; the ditch excavated into the 
emergency spillway would have resulted in velocity exceeding 
1.5 m/s (5 ft/s). 
The specific erosion mechanism is illustrated and explained by 
Seed et al. (2006). This group extensively studied the soil 
erosion process in levee over-topping after the Hurricane 
Katrina disaster in New Orleans. The work by Seed et al. is 
not specifically applicable to vegetated earth spillways, but the 
erosion principle for soils is the same in the levee study and in 
the case of the dam spillway. Results of the New Orleans 
levee study match the specific events of the dam spillway: the 
erosion of a fine sand soil. The levee study parameters for 
velocity and critical shear stress apply to a bare soil without 
vegetation. For the dam spillway, once the vegetation was lost 
during the breach event, the resulting bare soil was then 
similar to the study condition.  
Figure 8 illustrates that the fine silty sand soil within the 
dam’s emergency spillway is generally the most easily eroded 
soil category and that erosion will result in this soil at a shear 
stress of about 0.1 N/m2, the minimum for all soil types.  
 
 
Fig. 7. Range of sustainable velocity on vegetated earth 
surface (FERC 2003). 
 
Fig. 8. Quantified measure of erodibility—critical shear stress 
versus mean soil grain size (Seed et al. 2006). 
Figure 9 shows that for shear stress above the threshold value 
for fine sand, 0.1 N/m2, a significant scour rate results. For the 
water velocity imparted to the spillway during the failure 
storm, exceeding 1.0 m/s, Fig. 8 indicates that the fine sand in 
the spillway would erode at a rate exceeding 1,000 mm/hr. 
These values apply to a bare soil not protected by vegetation. 
Accordingly, the values do not establish specific parameters 
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Fig. 9. Erodibility function for a sand (Seed et. al. 2006).
for velocity and erosion rates applicable to the dam spillway. 
However, Fig. 8 does provide aquantifiable indication that 
erosion would take place within the dam spillway during the 
breach storm event. 
With the expected scour rate over 1,000 mm/hr and velocity 
imparted to the spillway exceeding 1 m/s, Fig. 10 illustrates 
that the spillway would have been highly erodible and prone 
to failure by overtopping. The levee study results depicted in 
Figs. 8 through 10, combined with the sustainable velocity 
range portrayed in Fig. 7, explain why erosion resulted in the 
spillway during the breach storm event. 
 
Fig. 10. Proposed guidelines for levee overtopping (Seed et al. 
2006) 
NRCS (1997) defines the specific process of erosion in earth 
dam spillways using a three-phase process: 
1. The failure of the vegetal cover protection (if any) 
and the development of concentrated flow. 
2. The downward and downstream erosion associated 
with the concentrated flow that leads to formation of 
a vertical or near-vertical head-cut in the vicinity of 
initial failure. 
3. The upstream advance and deepening of the head-cut 
resulting from flow over the vertical or near-vertical 
face. 
Figure 11 illustrates the three-phase mechanism described 
above for over-topping failure in earth dams. Failure is 
initiated by erosion of the soil particles due to excess velocity. 
A near-vertical face is formed, which travels progressively 
toward the reservoir during the erosion process (head-cutting). 
Finally the head-cutting process effects complete breach of the 
dam. 
Overtopping is essentially the same erosion process that takes 
place in a vegetated earth spillway. This is especially true for 
the Archusa Creek Dam, as addressed in the DISCUSSION 
section of this paper. 
DISCUSSION 
Consequences of  Failure 
The dam was not a high hazard structure; consequences of 
failure had little effect on downstream property or 
infrastructure. As Fig. 2 illustrates, the Chickasawhay River is 
just downstream, close to the spillway discharge channel. 
Downstream development is sparse due to the river’s 
floodplain. At the time of the dam breach, local media 
reported a “wall of water” released from the dam. In fact, 
during the storm event, river stage rose above the lake 
elevation. Shortly after the dam breach, rising tail-water 
flowed into the reservoir from the river. Obviously there was 
no wall of water produced by the breach.  
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Fig. 11. Illustration of dam breach by overtopping- embankment breach test of a homogeneous non-plastic sandy soil conducted at the 
ARS Hydraulic Laboratory, Stillwater, OK (FEMA 2001). 
 
The real consequences of failure were economic ones. The 
water park was a prominent part of the local economy; the 
small community was dependent on it, and local merchants 
suffered when it was closed. The cost of repair to the dam was 
the most significant consequence, an estimated cost of $1.3 
million. 
Earth Spillway Design    
Established design methods call for earth spillways to be 
located at abutments and founded in cut to prevent the erosion 
of fill soil. The NRCS has extensive guidance for location, 
alignment, and grade for an emergency spillway (summarized 
below) so that erosion will not cause a breach failure. Figure 
12 illustrates design guidance for these criteria. 
• Location—The most important element of location is 
to place the spillway where erosion and breach does 
not result in dam failure. As discussed above, this 
criterion is met by locating the spillway at an 
abutment, cut into native soil (alternatively the 
spillway can be cut through a saddle in terrain on the 
lake perimeter). Preferred location for the spillway is 
where it can discharge downstream without flow onto 
the toe of the dam. For sites where this alignment is 
impractical, training dikes can be used to keep flow 
off of the dam toe, but this configuration is not 
preferable.  
• Alignment and grade—The spillway control section 
is designed to reduce velocity over the spillway to a 
sustainable level. Alignment and slope on the 
spillway are set so that velocity stays within the 
sustainable range for the length of the spillway. 
The earthen emergency spillway design for the Archusa Creek 
Dam did not conform to these criteria. The spillway was 
located in the middle of the dam, with its bottom in fill where 
it should have been at an abutment in cut. The spillway did not 
have a control section sufficient to lower velocity to a 
sustainable level. Further, the drainage ditch excavated into 
the spillway concentrated flow and increased velocity, 
initiating erosion during the failure storm. 
 
With the emergency spillway out of conformance with these 
guidelines, erosion was a threat to dam safety. The choice of 
grass for the emergency spillway lining was inappropriate. 
Some armored lining, e.g., rip-rap, would be required for the 
emergency spillway geometry in order to prevent erosion that 
could result in dam breach. 
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Fig. 12. Diagram illustrating proper emergency spillway 
layout (From NRCS (1997)). 
Hydraulic Design   
NRCS design guides and most state regulations require that 
reservoir storage and principal spillway capacity allow for 
flow over an emergency spillway at a storm return period of 
100 years. The 1998 configuration of the Archusa Creek Dam 
emergency spillway resulted in flow on an almost 2-year 
frequency.  
CONCLUSIONS AND PROMINENT LESSONS 
For the 1998 dam configuration, the earth emergency spillway 
had an activation frequency of every 2 years, where this 
frequency by current design standards should have been closer 
to 100 years. Consequently, the emergency spillway was used 
frequently, not on an emergency basis. For this frequency of 
use, the spillway should have been an armored auxiliary one.  
The dam breach was actually an over-topping failure. Because 
the earth emergency spillway was located in the interior of the 
dam (versus at an abutment), and built on fill (versus in cut), 
water flowing over this surface was essentially the same as 
flowing over the dam. 
This case shows the merit of the NRCS design guidance for 
earth emergency spillways. The features of the Archusa Creek 
Dam’s emergency spillway that did not conform to the NRCS 
design guide were the major factors leading to failure: 
• Location on the dam— The spillway was located 
near the center of the dam, in a position where 
erosion led to breach through the dam.  It was not 
positioned at the abutment cut into native soil. 
• Spillway surface—The surface was in fill versus cut 
into native soil. The use of erodible fill soil in the 
spillway established the speed limit for water flowing 
over it, roughly 0.8 m/s (2.5 ft/s). The 1998 storm 
produced flow with velocity much greater than this 
limit. 
• Lack of control section—There was no means to 
control velocity at the spillway entrance. With no 
control section, the excavation of the ditch into the 
emergency spillway set up a flow velocity that would 
exceed the speed limit discussed above. 
• Unsuitable lining—Grass over erodible soil would 
not sustain the discharge velocity and frequency. 
Setting the Stage for Failure—A  Speed Limit on the 
Emergency Spillway 
Modifications to the dam set the stage for failure. The so-
called widening of the emergency spillway was essentially 
lowering the top of the dam, thus reducing freeboard. 
Excavating into the dam at the position of the emergency 
spillway near the middle of the dam involved excavating 
embankment fill material. This operation essentially lowered 
the top of the dam. With reduced freeboard and a design that 
entailed the storm pool to reach the emergency spillway on a 
2-year frequency, the stage was set for failure by over-topping. 
The modification to the principal spillway added another 
element for potential failure. Changes in the principal spillway 
included the addition of an ogee weir with manual sluice 
gates. The gates and the weir crest were all fitted with fish-
retaining grates, as illustrated in Fig. 2. As Fig. 2 illustrates, 
the grates collected significant debris during the storm event, 
consequently restricting flow capacity through and over the 
spillway. The reduced capacity from the clogged grates was 
probably never envisioned or accounted for in the dam 
modification. While the disadvantage of grates over the 
spillway openings is evident, there is little known benefit. 
The final modification, excavation of a ditch into the 
emergency spillway, was the factor that put the failure 
mechanism into motion. After this modification, the only 
required ingredient was a storm of sufficient size to raise the 
lake above flood-pool and send water over the emergency 
spillway with sufficient velocity. The modifications to the dam 
had established a speed limit for water over the vegetated 
emergency spillway. Unfortunately, nature would not abide by 
this speed limit and supplied a flow of water exceeding it. 
Flow on the spillway exceeding the speed limit initiated the 
failure by starting the erosion process that steadily progressed 
to a breach. 
Repair 
Several alternatives were considered for repair of the dam and 
its return to service. Immediately after the dam failure, local 
government proposed $500,000 in funding to re-fill the breach 
and return the dam to service. However, it was pointed out that 
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this investment would only put the dam back into the same 
deficient condition that it was in when it failed. 
A concrete labyrinth weir spillway was selected as the main 
repair component; it was built within the gully made by the 
breach. This new concrete spillway, now used as an auxiliary 
spillway, has helped designers solve the problem of flow over 
an earthen emergency spillway at a 2-year frequency and 
should prevent such a disaster in the future. 
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